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INDIVIDUALIZED VS. GENERALIZED
ASSESSMENTS: WHY RLUIPA SHOULD NOT
APPLY TO EVERY LAND-USE REQUEST
KATIE M. ERTMER†
ABSTRACT
Courts and advocates alike have struggled to articulate a coherent
rule regarding when the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) should apply to local governments’ land-use
decisions. When it is applied too broadly, RLUIPA runs roughshod
over the ability of state and local governments to control their own
land-use patterns, and it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment and federalism precedents. When applied too narrowly,
RLUIPA fails to provide a remedy for victims of religious
discrimination. This Note explains the legally cognizable—but
previously unrecognized—differences between the types of land-use
decisions that local governments make, and it argues that RLUIPA
should apply to individualized assessments, such as use permits and
variances, but that RLUIPA should not apply to generalized
assessments, such as requests for zoning-ordinance amendments. This
Note uses two recent Ninth Circuit cases—one of which would have
been decided differently if the court had used the proposed
distinction—to illustrate how an analysis of individualized and
generalized assessments would work in practice.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel
(ICFG) entered into a contract to purchase property in San Leandro,
1
California, that it believed would suit its growing congregation.
Several weeks later, church officials met with city staff, who informed
the ICFG that the property was located in an industrial zoning
district, which did not permit any type of assembly use, including
2
churches. After the city denied the church’s requests to amend the
city’s zoning ordinance, the ICFG sued the city, alleging three claims
under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
3
4
2000 (RLUIPA) and six constitutional claims. The district court
5
granted the city’s motion for summary judgment on all claims,
expressing concern that “[c]arried to its logical conclusion, [the
ICFG’s] argument would ultimately exempt religious assemblies (as
opposed to other entities) from the requirement of complying with
6
any zoning regulation, regardless of how neutrally applied.” On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the city’s consideration of the
ICFG’s requests was within the scope of RLUIPA and reversed the
7
district court on two of the ICFG’s RLUIPA claims. The appellate
court remanded the case, holding that the city failed to articulate a
8
compelling reason for its denial of the ICFG’s requests.
Despite the district court’s warning, the Ninth Circuit articulated
no limiting principles to its holding in International Church of the
9
Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro. Additionally, its
application of RLUIPA to San Leandro’s denial of the ICFG’s
rezoning requests suffers from three major flaws. First, the decision
rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of what a request to amend
a zoning ordinance actually entails. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit

1. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 632 F. Supp. 2d 925, 930
(N.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 634 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011).
2. Id. at 931–32.
3. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114
Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006)).
4. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 935–36.
5. Id. at 946.
6. Id. at 943.
7. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011).
8. Id.
9. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011).
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erred when it determined that San Leandro’s consideration of the
ICFG’s rezoning requests constituted an individualized assessment,
which is subject to RLUIPA. Instead, it should have found that San
Leandro’s consideration of the ICFG’s requests was a generalized
assessment, which should fall outside the scope of the statute. Second,
the Ninth Circuit’s construction of RLUIPA fails to comport with
both Supreme Court precedent regarding the Free Exercise Clause
and Congress’s Section 5 enforcement authority conferred by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Third, the Ninth Circuit’s holding threatens
to undermine the federal-state balance in which the regulation of land
10
use has been a “traditional state power,” “the quintessential state
11
activity,” and “a function traditionally performed by local
12
governments.” The Ninth Circuit’s decision thus enables a massive
federal intrusion into an area of law that, as recognized in the
13
Supreme Court’s decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
14
traditionally has been reserved to the states.
RLUIPA is Congress’s second attempt to establish strict scrutiny
for local land-use decisions made when the applicant is a religious
15
institution. This goal is not entirely misguided; robust judicial
deference to local control has sometimes come at the expense of the
16
rights of minorities or the poor. Indeed, even Justice Sutherland’s
17
opinion in Euclid contains discriminatory language that would
offend the sensibilities of the many modern urban planners who are

10. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173
(2001).
11. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1983).
12. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994).
13. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
14. See id. at 397 (1926) (upholding the general power of local governments to pass zoning
ordinances). Although this Note focuses on California, its main argument—that courts may
apply RLUIPA only to individualized assessments of land uses—is applicable in any jurisdiction
that uses Euclidian zoning.
15. The Supreme Court declared Congress’s first attempt, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), invalidated in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997)), to be in part beyond the scope of Congress’s enforcement power under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
16. See generally DAVID M.P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE
RACIAL POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (2007) (detailing how local organizations enabled
and enforced racial segregation in housing from the 1920s through the 1970s).
17. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394 (“[V]ery often the apartment house is a mere parasite,
constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created
by the residential character of the district.”).
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“dedicated to advancing the art, science and profession of good
planning—physical, economic and social—to create communities that
18
offer better choices for where and how people work and live.” A
heightened consciousness of how land-use planning historically has
been used as a tool for discrimination led Congress to enact statutes
aimed at ensuring that municipalities use their extensive land-use
19
power for legitimate ends.
This Note offers a reading of RLUIPA that rests on the
fundamental and legally cognizable differences between the
individualized assessments that local governments conduct when
considering land-use requests, such as use permits, and the
generalized assessments that local governments conduct when
considering requests to amend zoning ordinances. By its own terms,
RLUIPA does not apply to generalized assessments, and this Note’s
proposed reading of the statute is the best and most plausible
construction because it avoids the constitutional problems raised by
the Ninth Circuit’s holding in San Leandro. First, this proposed
reading renders RLUIPA consistent with Supreme Court precedent
regarding the scope of Congress’s Section 5 power to enforce the Free
Exercise Clause. Second, it strikes the appropriate federal-state
balance in an area of regulation that traditionally has been reserved
to the states. Third, it preserves RLUIPA for cases in which
governments conduct individualized assessments, cases in which
arbitrary or discriminatory denials of land-use requests may be more
likely.
To illustrate these arguments, this Note compares San Leandro
to another Ninth Circuit RLUIPA case from 2006, Guru Nanak Sikh
20
Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter. In Guru Nanak, the
religious institution sought and, on two separate occasions, was
denied a use permit to construct a temple in the unincorporated area
21
of Sutter County, California. Under California’s land-use and
planning statutes, a use permit is procedurally and substantively
distinct from the rezoning applications that were at issue in San

18. About Planning, AM. PLANNING ASS’N, http://www.planning.org/aboutplanning (last
visited Aug. 26, 2012).
19. For example, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 73
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006)), protects the buyers and renters of real
estate from discriminatory practices.
20. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006).
21. Id. at 982.
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22

Leandro. The individualized assessment conducted by Sutter County
was not the same as the generalized assessment conducted by San
Leandro. Had the Ninth Circuit recognized this important difference
between the cases, it would have reached a different conclusion in
San Leandro and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of the city.
This Note provides a new and principled way for courts to
23
analyze whether a local land-use decision is subject to RLUIPA.
Part I discusses the background of RLUIPA and the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence regarding the Free Exercise Clause and Congress’s
Section 5 enforcement authority. Part II contains a summary of
zoning ordinances in general and California land-use law in
particular. Part III explains the differences between Guru Nanak and
San Leandro. Part IV proposes a construction of RLUIPA and
describes why the Ninth Circuit was correct in Guru Nanak but
incorrect in San Leandro. Part V describes several constitutional
problems with the Ninth Circuit’s reading of RLUIPA in San
Leandro, problems that are avoided by construing RLUIPA based on
the distinction between individualized and generalized assessments.
I. THE ROAD TO RLUIPA
The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause states, “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
24
25
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” In Sherbert v. Verner, the
Supreme Court held that any state action that substantially burdens
26
the free exercise of religion would be subject to strict scrutiny. The
22. For a discussion of the differences between use permits and rezoning applications, see
infra Part II.B.
23. Additionally, this Note helps to resolve the circuit split regarding the application of
RLUIPA. Compare Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253,
275–77 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that applying a neutral, generally applicable law does not
constitute an individualized assessment within the scope of RLUIPA), and Civil Liberties for
Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 764 (7th Cir. 2003) (same), with Int’l Church
of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir.) (holding that
any case-by-case assessment of a land-use proposal is subject to RLUIPA), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 251 (2011), and Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005) (same).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s authority to
enforce the Free Exercise Clause through Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment since 1940.
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The fundamental concept of liberty
embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment.”).
25. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
26. Id. at 404.
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Court defined “substantial burden” as something that requires one to
“choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
27
religion . . . on the other hand.”
Nearly thirty years later, however, in Employment Division v.
28
Smith, the Supreme Court applied rational basis review rather than
strict scrutiny to a substantial burden imposed by government on the
exercise of religion. The Court concluded that the State of Oregon
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause when it denied
unemployment benefits to two men who were fired for ingesting an
illegal drug, notwithstanding the fact that the men had ingested the
29
drug during a religious ceremony. The Supreme Court drew an
important distinction between engaging in religious conduct that is
permitted by law and engaging in religious conduct that is prohibited
30
by law. The Court stated that “[i]t is a permissible reading of the
text . . . to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the
object . . . but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision [of a law], the First Amendment has not
31
been offended.” Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia went on to
say that “more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence
contradicts” the proposition “that an individual’s religious beliefs
excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
32
conduct that the State is free to regulate.”
Smith divided free-exercise jurisprudence into two lines. The preSmith line—in which courts apply strict scrutiny and typified by cases
33
such as Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, Thomas v.
34
Review Board, and Sherbert—still applies when the government
substantially burdens religious exercise “where the State has in place
a system of individual exemptions” and refuses “to extend that system
27. Id. In spite of the test that the Court applied in Sherbert, the level of scrutiny applied to
free-exercise claims was not always clear. See Garrett Epps, The Story of Al Smith: The First
Amendment Meets Grandfather Peyote, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 455, 455 (Michael C.
Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009) (“For years, the Court[] . . . was unclear, although language in the Warren
and Burger Courts’ opinions suggested that the Constitution required government to show a
‘compelling interest.’”).
28. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
29. Id. at 886–90.
30. Id. at 876.
31. Id. at 878.
32. Id. at 878–79.
33. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
34. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.” But
when the substantial burden is imposed incidental to a law of general
36
applicability, Smith dictates that courts apply rational basis review.
The Court’s decision in Smith surprised many observers and
caused “a nationwide outcry by religious groups across the political
37
and theological spectrum.” In response, Congress adopted the
38
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) by a nearly
39
unanimous vote. RFRA stated that “[g]overnment shall not
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden
results from a rule of general applicability . . . [unless the application
of the regulation] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that
40
compelling interest.” In adopting RFRA, Congress found that
in Employment Division v. Smith . . . the Supreme Court virtually
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion;
and . . . the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between
41
religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.

Congress stated that its purpose in enacting RFRA was “to restore
the compelling interest test . . . and to guarantee its application in all
42
cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”
Four years after Congress enacted RFRA, the Supreme Court
was squarely presented with the task of deciding the statute’s
43
constitutionality in City of Boerne v. Flores. In Boerne, the Catholic
Archbishop of San Antonio sued the City of Boerne under RFRA
after the city refused to grant a church a permit to expand one of its
buildings when the expansion would have violated the city’s historic-

35. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883–84 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
36. E.g., Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 273
(3d Cir. 2007).
37. Epps, supra note 27, at 455–56.
38. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2006)), invalidated in part by City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
39. Epps, supra note 27, at 477; see also 139 CONG. REC. 9687, 26,416 (1993) (noting that
the bill passed by a voice vote in the House and a 97-3 vote in the Senate).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).
41. Id. § 2000bb(a)(4)–(5).
42. Id. § 2000bb(b)(1).
43. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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preservation ordinance. The Court responded by holding that
RFRA exceeded Congress’s enforcement authority under Section 5
45
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court stated that “[w]hile
preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there
must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be
46
achieved.” RFRA, the Court determined, “cannot be considered
47
remedial, preventive legislation” and was therefore unconstitutional.
Boerne thus represents a strong defense of states’ rights relative to
48
Congress’s Section 5 power.
In 2000, Congress responded to the Boerne decision by enacting
49
RLUIPA. RLUIPA did three significant things that RFRA did not.
First, RLUIPA is confined to two subject areas: land use and
50
institutionalized persons. Second, RLUIPA includes two additional
51
jurisdictional hooks: a Spending Clause hook and a Commerce
52
Clause hook. Third, Congress drafted the Section 5 hook in a way
that responds directly to language from Boerne, wherein Justice
Kennedy distinguished Boerne and Smith from the Sherbert line of
free-exercise cases. In Boerne, Justice Kennedy had written:

44. Id. at 512.
45. Id. at 511. The Supreme Court repeatedly cited Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803), and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), perhaps in an effort to
remind Congress that “the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers . . . [and] that the
‘powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or
forgotten, the constitution is written,’” Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 176).
46. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530.
47. Id. at 532.
48. Epps, supra note 27, at 479.
49. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-274, 114
Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2006)).
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006) (concerning land use for religious exercise); id. § 2000cc-1
(concerning exercise of religion by institutionalized persons). Limiting RLUIPA to these two
categories may have been in response to the Supreme Court’s statements in Boerne denouncing
the breadth of RFRA: “RFRA is not so confined. Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at
every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every
description and regardless of subject matter.” Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532. In 2005, the Supreme
Court rejected a facial challenge to the constitutionality of RLUIPA under the Establishment
Clause. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724–25 (2005).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2) (“This subsection applies in any case in which (A) the
substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance,
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability . . . .”).
52. See id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (“This subsection applies in any case in which . . . (B) the
substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with
foreign nations, among the several States, or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results from
a rule of general applicability . . . .”).
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Those cases [that impose a strict scrutiny test] . . . stand for ‘the
proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual
exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
religious hardship without compelling reason.’ By contrast, where a
general prohibition, such as Oregon’s, is at issue, ‘the sounder
approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our
precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to [free exercise]
challenges.’ Smith held that neutral, generally applicable laws may
be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a
53
compelling governmental interest.

RLUIPA’s Section 5 hook states that the Act applies when a
“substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use
regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a
government makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or
practices that permit the government to make, individualized
54
assessments of the proposed uses for the property involved.” By
55
using the phrase “individualized assessments,” Congress attempted
56
to equate land-use decisions with the “individual exemptions” that
57
continue to trigger strict scrutiny after Smith. But an assessment is
53. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514 (third alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted) (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 874, 884–85 (1990)).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added). Because neither Guru Nanak nor San
Leandro reached the question of whether the municipality’s land-use decision fell within the
scope of RLUIPA pursuant to either the Spending Clause or the Commerce Clause, this Note
focuses exclusively on RLUIPA’s Section 5 hook. Spending Clause jurisprudence suggests that a
municipality receiving federal funds for its land-use planning would be required to comply with
RLUIPA. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (recognizing that to fall within the
Spending Clause power, “conditions on federal grants” must, among other things, relate “to the
federal interest in particular national projects or programs”). The analysis would be less
straightforward if the municipality received federal funds for a program only tangentially
related to its land-use planning, such as for community policing. An analysis of the
constitutionality of RLUIPA under the Commerce Clause could involve inquiring whether the
regulated activity—the imposition of a substantial burden on religious exercise from a rule of
general applicability—substantially affects interstate commerce or whether the regulated
activity is economic or noneconomic in nature. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559
(1995) (discussing “those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce”). See generally
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (discussing the economic/noneconomic
dichotomy).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C).
56. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 537 (1993)
(“As we noted in Smith, in circumstances in which individualized exemptions from a general
requirement are available, the government ‘may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
religious hardship without compelling reason.’” (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
57. For example, in a statement issued prior to the passage of RLUIPA, Senators Orrin
Hatch and Ted Kennedy stated that “the land use provisions of this bill satisfy the constitutional
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not the same thing as an exemption. An exemption is “[f]reedom
58
from a duty, liability, or other requirement.” RLUIPA does not
define “assessment” or “individualized assessment,” and Black’s Law
Dictionary provides no on-point definition. It is reasonable to
conclude, however, that Congress intended the term to have its
ordinary dictionary meaning of “the act of assessing; appraisal;
59
evaluation.” This definition would encompass decisions about
whether to grant an exemption to religious institutions from
otherwise generally applicable rules, decisions that, presumably,
would still be subject to strict scrutiny following Smith and Boerne.
Courts that broadly apply RLUIPA to every land-use decision
ignore the fact that RLUIPA, by its own terms, applies only to
individualized assessments. Although a broad reading of RLUIPA
may eliminate discrimination by providing a federal cause of action to
religious institutions, it does so at a high cost. RLUIPA reaches
deeply into state land-use law and local land-use decisions by
requiring municipalities to articulate a compelling reason for applying
an otherwise-valid and generally applicable system of land-use
regulations. Because understanding land-use law is critical to
understanding RLUIPA and its associated jurisprudence, the
following Part contains a general discussion of land-use law and a
closer examination of California land-use law.
II. A LAND-USE LAW PRIMER
A. Land-Use Law and Zoning Generally
In the 1920s, zoning began to replace nuisance law and private
restrictive covenants as the primary way to avoid conflicts between

standard [of Section 5] legally.” 146 CONG. REC. 16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sens. Hatch
and Kennedy). They went on to explain that “[w]here government makes such individualized
assessments, permitting some uses and excluding others, it cannot exclude religious uses without
compelling justification.” Id. The senators cited Babalu Aye and Smith to support their
assertion. Id. But Smith did not involve an individualized assessment, it concerned a request for
an exemption from a generally applicable law. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. In
Babalu Aye, the individualized assessment that the Court found objectionable was the city’s
evaluation of the reasons motivating the slaughter of animals. Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 538–39.
Thus, even if a land-use assessment is individualized and not generalized, the Babalu Aye test
would not preclude a city from disapproving the construction of a religious facility, so long as
the disapproval was based on an assessment of the land-use impacts, as opposed to an
assessment of the religious motivations behind the conduct of constructing the facility.
58. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 653 (9th ed. 2009).
59. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 75 (2005).
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60

users of land. Like all land-use regulations, zoning is an application
of the police power, which is “the power of the states and their
legislatures to enact regulations over persons and property to prohibit
all things inimical to their citizens’ health, safety, morals, and general
61
62
welfare.” The police power is reserved generally to the states and
63
functions pursuant to each state’s constitution. Municipalities, such
as cities and counties, are creatures of the states and may only
64
exercise power granted by the state government. Therefore,
municipal zoning powers must be derived from a state policy
65
explicitly conferring such authority.
In 1924, the United States Department of Commerce developed
66
the Standard Zoning Enabling Act to serve as a model for states that
67
wished to delegate land-use authority to their municipalities. Since
then, every state has adopted a statewide zoning-enabling act that
delegates land-use regulatory authority to municipalities and other
68
planning agencies. Following the Supreme Court’s 1926 decision in
Euclid, municipalities across the United States have adopted zoning
ordinances, including every large city—with the exception of
69
70
Houston —and the majority of smaller cities and localities. Zoning
60. BARLOW BURKE, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS
75 (2d ed. 2009).
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id. at 3–4.
63. Id. at 7.
64. The Supreme Court affirmed this state-municipal relationship in Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), when it said that “[m]unicipal corporations are political
subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental
powers of the State as may be entrusted to them,” id. at 178. Nonetheless, many states have
amended their constitutions to allow cities to adopt a charter to partially exempt themselves
from the tight legislative control described by Dillon’s Rule. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
Moreover, charter cities in California are granted autonomy only over municipal affairs as
opposed to matters of statewide concern, and the line between municipal affairs and matters of
statewide concern may change over time. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Los
Angeles, 812 P.2d 916, 924 (Cal. 1991) (“We have said that the task of determining whether a
given activity is a ‘municipal affair’ or one of statewide concern is an ad hoc inquiry; that ‘the
constitutional concept of municipal affairs is not a fixed or static quantity’ . . . .” (quoting Pac.
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 336 P.2d 514, 517 (Cal. 1959))).
65. BURKE, supra note 60, at 75.
66. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (rev. ed. 1926),
reprinted in MODEL LAND DEV. CODE art. 8, app. C (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1968).
67. See id.
68. BURKE, supra note 60, at 75–76.
69. Danyahel Norris, Houston Gentrification: Options for Current Residents of the Third
Ward, 35 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 239, 243 (2010).
70. Id.
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is one of the main functions of local governments, which use zoning
ordinances to preserve land for agriculture and open space, redevelop
blighted neighborhoods, conserve natural resources, and achieve
72
countless other goals that may be unique to each locale.
B. California Land-Use Law
Modern land-use planning in California grew out of the
perceived mistakes that occurred in conjunction with rapid economic
growth and the resulting land development during the 1940s and
73
1950s. Heightened social and environmental awareness nationwide
74
led Congress to pass the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969
75
and California to pass the California Environmental Quality Act in
76
1970. Although California has required municipalities to adopt
77
general plans for development since 1927, the state modified the
California Government Code in 1971 to make the local general plan
78
“a ‘constitution’ for future development.”
1. General Plans. The State of California has delegated its landuse authority to cities and counties, and it requires all municipalities
to adopt and follow general plans to “guide future local land use

71. BURKE, supra note 60, at 75.
72. See generally Edna Sussman, Reshaping Municipal and County Laws To Foster Green
Building, Energy Efficiency, and Renewable Energy, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2008).
73. See 1 JAMES LONGTIN, LONGTIN’S CALIFORNIA LAND USE 9–10 (3d prtg. 1994) (“The
mistakes of the ’40s and ’50s became painfully apparent to the social activist generation of the
’60s, thus spawning the advent of serious planning and environmental controls.”); see also Selby
Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 514 P.2d 111, 117 (Cal. 1973) (“The deleterious
consequences of haphazard community growth in this state and the need to prevent further
random development are evident to even the most casual observer. The Legislature has
attempted to alleviate the problem by authorizing the adoption of long-range plans for orderly
progress.”). See generally KEVIN STARR, CALIFORNIA: A HISTORY 237–42 (2005) (providing an
excellent discussion of the rapid and massive growth of California following World War II). In
Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 170 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Ct. App. 1981), the California Court
of Appeals upheld a local ordinance that made the collection of school fees a condition
precedent to the development of property, capturing the state’s sentiment about unmanaged
growth when it stated, “[d]evelopment is a privilege, not a right.” Id. at 691.
74. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4335, 4341–4347 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)).
75. California Environmental Quality Act of 1970, ch. 1433, 1970 Cal. Stat. 2780 (codified
as amended at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21177 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012)).
76. LONGTIN, supra note 73, at 10.
77. Act of June 2, 1927, ch. 874, § 26, 1927 Cal. Stat. 1899, 1910–11.
78. Lesher Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 321 (Cal. 1990).
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79

decisions.” The general plan is “located at the top of ‘the hierarchy
80
of local government law regulating land use.’” Every municipality
must “adopt a comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical
development of the county or city, and of any land outside its
boundaries which in the planning agency’s judgment bears relation to
81
its planning.” All general plans are required to address seven
“elements . . . to the extent that the subject of the element exists in
82
the planning area.” The seven required elements are (1) land use,
(2) circulation, (3) housing, (4) conservation, (5) open space,
83
(6) noise, and (7) safety. A municipality may amend its general plan
84
when “it deems it to be in the public interest,” but it may not amend
any required element—including the land-use element—more than
85
four times per year.
Although the California Legislature requires cities and counties
to adopt and follow general plans, the Legislature did not intend for
86
all general plans to look alike. One major way that general plans
differ from one another is through the land-use element, which must
designate the “general location and extent of the uses of the land for
housing, business, industry, open space, including agriculture, natural
resources, recreation, and enjoyment of scenic beauty, education,
public buildings and grounds, solid and liquid waste disposal facilities,
87
and other categories of public and private uses of land.” The landuse element of a typical general plan contains many broad policy
statements and goals as well as a map showing the location of each
88
appropriate type of land use in the jurisdiction.
79. DeVita v. Cnty. of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1025 (Cal. 1995).
80. Id. at 1024 (quoting Neighborhood Action Grp. v. Cnty. of Calaveras, 203 Cal. Rptr.
401, 406 (Ct. App. 1984)).
81. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65300 (West 2010).
82. Id. § 65301(c).
83. Id. § 65302 (West 2010 & Supp. 2012).
84. Id. § 65358(a) (West 2010).
85. Id. § 65358(b). The code creates certain exemptions to this general rule, such as
amendments to accommodate housing occupied by low-income individuals, id. § 65358(c), and
amendments in response to a court order, id. § 65358(d)(1).
86. See id. § 65300.7 (“The Legislature finds that the diversity of the state’s communities
and their residents requires planning agencies and legislative bodies to implement this article in
ways that accommodate local conditions and circumstances, while meeting its minimum
requirements.”).
87. Id. § 65302(a) (West 2010 & Supp. 2012).
88. See, e.g., Yuba City, Cal., Yuba City General Plan ch. 3 (2004), available at http://www.
yubacity.net/documents/Planning/YC-GPAC-Apr-04-Ch-3-FINAL.pdf (including “[t]he guiding
principles of the land use framework [and] the General Plan Diagram”).
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The California Government Code requires planning agencies to
implement the general plan through other documents, one of which is
89
the zoning ordinance. If the general plan is analogous to a
90
“constitution” for future development, a zoning ordinance is
analogous to a statute. The zoning ordinance itself, and decisions
made pursuant to the zoning ordinance, must follow the general
91
plan. “Additionally, general plans are policy documents, whereas
92
zoning ordinances are laws. Therefore, a “general plan does not
violate substantive due process as long as it advances any legitimate
93
public purpose” whereas a zoning law “must clearly delineate the
94
conduct it proscribes.” Because the zoning ordinance implements
the general plan, a zoning regulation can be construed by referring to
95
the general plan.
2. Zoning Ordinances: Permitted and Conditionally Permitted
Uses. California’s legislature permits municipalities to “divide a
96
county, a city, or portions thereof, into zones.” In granting
municipalities control over zoning decisions, the legislature provided
only a few limitations “in order that counties and cities may exercise
97
the maximum degree of control over local zoning matters,” while at
the same time specifying certain minimum standards with which the
98
municipalities must comply. For example, the legislature stated that
all zoning regulations must “be uniform for each class or kind of

89. GOV’T § 65103(b) (West 2010).
90. Lesher Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 322 (Cal. 1990) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
91. GOV’T § 65860 (West 2009); see also Fonseca v. City of Gilroy, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 374, 379
(Ct. App. 2007) (“Local land use decisions must be consistent with the general plan. Thus, for
example, zoning ordinances, which are subordinate to the general plan, are required to be
consistent with it.”).
92. JOHN EASTMAN, EASTMAN’S CALIFORNIA LAND USE & MUNICIPAL LAW § 8.01
(2008).
93. Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1994).
94. Foti v. City of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 638 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
95. See EASTMAN, supra note 92, § 8.01 (“[Z]oning regulations may be construed by
reference to the general plan; the general plan provides the backdrop against which zoning
regulations are interpreted.”).
96. GOV’T § 65851.
97. Id. § 65800.
98. Id. § 65850.
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building or use of land throughout each zone, but the regulation in
99
one type of zone may differ from those in other types of zones.”
Zoning ordinances regulate land use via two mechanisms:
(1) they divide the municipality into distinct geographic districts, and
(2) they establish criteria and procedures for the evaluation of
100
proposed uses within each district. Within the first mechanism, the
zoning ordinance must conform to the policies contained in the
general plan. As the Supreme Court of California explained:
The Planning and Zoning Law itself precludes consideration of a
zoning ordinance which conflicts with a general plan as a pro tanto
repeal or implied amendment of the general plan. The general plan
stands. A zoning ordinance that is inconsistent with the general plan
is invalid when passed and one that was originally consistent but has
become inconsistent must be brought into conformity with the
general plan. The Planning and Zoning Law does not contemplate
that general plans will be amended to conform to zoning ordinances.
The tail does not wag the dog. The general plan is the charter to
101
which the ordinance must conform.

Within the second mechanism, the evaluation of proposed uses,
the zoning ordinance typically includes two types of regulations:
(1) regulations that pertain to the “structural and architectural design
of the buildings,” such as limitations on the height, size, and distance
between buildings and property lines, and (2) regulations that
“prescribe the use to which buildings within certain designated
102
districts may be put.” A zoning map provides the zoning of each
parcel, and a zoning ordinance contains the standards governing the
allowable uses in a particular zone. To provide a clearer explanation
of how zoning ordinances work, this Note uses Yuba City, California,
to illustrate how one determines whether a use is permitted and what
103
level of review is required to permit the use.
99. Id. § 65852. This provision is professionally known by planners and developers as the
“like uses alike” principle.
100. LONGTIN, supra note 73, at 234.
101. Lesher Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 322 (Cal. 1990) (citations
omitted).
102. LONGTIN, supra note 73, at 234.
103. Because Guru Nanak and San Leandro only dealt with the permissibility of uses, this
Note does not undertake a detailed discussion of structural and architectural standards, such as
minimum lot size or height requirements. Exceptions to structural and architectural standards
may be granted pursuant to a variance. Variance procedures are described in detail in section
65906 of the California Government Code. Under this Note’s proposed reading of RLUIPA, a
request for a variance would be an individualized assessment and thus within the scope of
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104

Yuba City’s zoning ordinance is typical in that it employs a
table to describe the allowable uses in a particular zone. The tables
below are excerpted from the chapters pertaining to the M-1 (Light
Industrial) and the R-1 (One-Family Residence) districts in Yuba
105
City’s zoning ordinance. Although each zoning district permits
different types of uses, the tables are similar in how they are
organized: the first column provides a list of categorically permitted
uses in the zoning district, and the second, third, and fourth columns
correspond to the three types of review that Yuba City conducts for
the allowable uses. The stringency of the review assigned to each use
is based on the likelihood that the use will conflict with other existing
106
or allowable uses in the same zoning district.
Table 1. M-1, Light Industrial Use Table
Uses

Permitted

Auto body and painting
shop

X

Cabinet shop

X

Bulk product storage
(indoor)
Commercial coach
(temporary)
Commercial coach (less
than 10,000 square feet)

X

Zoning
Clearance

Use Permit

X
X

RLUIPA, assuming that the municipality’s zoning ordinance includes a mechanism for
approving variance requests.
104. YUBA CITY, CAL., MUN. CODE, tit. 8, ch. 5 (2011).
105. For a complete list of uses in the M-1 district, see id. § 8-5.2002. For the list of uses in
the R-1 district, see id. § 8-5.502.
106. See, e.g., id. § 8-5.7001 (stating that “[t]he process provides for increasing levels of
review based on the size or intensity of a project”).
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Table 2. R-1, One-Family Residence Use Table
Uses

Permitted

Zoning
Clearance

Use Permit

X

Model homes
One-family residence

X

One-family residence
(zero-lot line)
Parking lot for an offsite use
Public parks and
playgrounds

X
X
X

a. Permitted Uses and Uses Requiring a Zoning Clearance.
Certain uses are permitted as a matter of right in each district. For
example, in the M-1 district, one may operate an auto body and
painting shop; in the R-1 district, one may construct a one-family
residence. For permitted uses, planning staff review is limited to
ensuring that all proposed uses conform to the minimum structural
and architectural standards established for each district, such as lot
size, minimum distance from property lines, and height
107
requirements.
Certain uses, such as having a model home in the R-1 district,
require a zoning clearance before they may be undertaken. To obtain
a zoning clearance, the project proponent must demonstrate to the
planning staff that the proposed project conforms to objective, usespecific standards listed in the code in addition to the standards that
108
are required for the permitted uses in the district. For example, an
applicant who wants to establish a model home must first meet the
minimum requirements of the R-1 district and must also obtain a
zoning clearance to ensure compliance with the additional model109
home standards. If the proposal meets all of the requirements,

107. See, e.g., id. § 8.5-503 (requiring a “[m]inimum lot size” of “5,000 sq. ft., 6,000 sq. ft. for
corner lots”).
108. For a description of Yuba City’s zoning-clearance procedures, see id. § 8-5.7002.
109. See id. § 8-5.5002(c) (establishing several standards specific to model homes, including a
time limit for the operation of the home).
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including the additional use-specific requirements, the code requires
110
that the proposed use be approved.
b. Uses Requiring a Use Permit. Although the California
Government Code neither defines nor establishes standards for
111
approving use permits, the California Supreme Court has stated
that a use permit may be granted “after consideration by a
governmental agency as to whether the proposed other use will be in
the best interests of public convenience and necessity and not
112
contrary to the public welfare.” Municipalities have substantial
discretion in setting their own standards for issuing use permits,
113
provided that the standards are set forth in a zoning ordinance.
Generally, the municipality reviews the proposed use in relation to
the surrounding neighborhood and may approve the proposal if the
use meets certain standards, including the “general welfare standard”
114
and the “nuisance standard.” Use permits must conform not only to

110. Id. § 8-5.7002.
111. The government code does, however, refer to use permits. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T.
CODE § 65850.5(b) (West 2009) (“[T]he city or county may require the applicant [of a solar
energy system] to apply for a use permit.”); id. § 65852.7 (“A mobile home park . . . shall be
deemed a permitted land use on all land planned and zoned for residential land use as
designated by the applicable general plan; provided, however, that a city, county, or a city and
county may require a use permit.”).
112. Sports Arenas Props., Inc. v. City of San Diego, 710 P.2d 338, 341 (Cal. 1985); see also
People v. Perez, 29 Cal. Rptr. 781, 783 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1963) (“The device of providing
for the issuance of a special use permit is well recognized as legitimate zoning procedure. It
permits the inclusion in the zoning pattern of uses considered by the legislative body to be
essentially desirable to the community, but which because of the nature thereof or their
concomitants (noise, traffic, congestion, effect on values, etc.,) militate against their existence in
every location in a zone, or in any location without restrictions tailored to fit the special
problems which the uses present.”).
113. Section 65905 of the California Government Code requires a planning agency to hold a
public hearing for consideration of a use permit. To meet constitutional requirements for due
process, the agency must also provide advance public notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a
fair hearing. See Horn v. Cnty. of Ventura, 596 P.2d 1134, 1140 (Cal. 1979) (“We therefore
conclude that, whenever approval of a tentative subdivision map will constitute a substantial or
significant deprivation of the property rights of other landowners, the affected persons are
entitled to a reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard before the approval occurs.”).
114. The Conditional Use Permit, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RESEARCH (Aug.
1997), http://ceres.ca.gov/planning/cup/condition.htm. For a discussion of the general welfare
standard, see generally Hawkins v. Cnty. of Marin, 126 Cal. Rptr. 754, 758 & n.8 (Ct. App.
1976). For a discussion of the nuisance standard, see generally Snow v. City of Garden Grove,
10 Cal. Rptr. 480, 481 (Ct. App. 1961).
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116

the zoning ordinance but to the general plan as well. Additionally,
the municipality must make written findings in support of any
117
decision to approve or deny a use permit.
Yuba City requires a use permit for uses that may have an “effect
on surrounding uses and the environment [that] typically cannot be
118
determined in advance . . . for a particular location.” To determine
when a use permit is required, one simply consults the appropriate
use table. The planning commission must conduct a noticed public
hearing and make findings about the appropriateness of the proposed
119
use, given the surroundings and the “general welfare of the City.”
The use-permit process is designed to ensure that the proposed use is
compatible with its surroundings. For example, one who applies to
Yuba City for a use permit to construct a parking lot in Yuba City’s
R-1 district might be required to shield parking lot lights to reduce
glare on neighboring residences, to provide a larger setback than
what would normally be required by the zoning ordinance, or to
install additional landscaping or a wall to create a sound buffer. The
conditions are context-specific and are imposed so as to permit a

115. See O’Hagen v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 96 Cal. Rptr. 484, 488 (Ct. App. 1971) (“To
obtain a use permit, the applicant must generally show that the contemplated use is compatible
with the policies and terms of the zoning ordinances . . . .”).
116. See Neighborhood Action Grp. v. Cnty. of Calaveras, 203 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (Ct. App.
1984) (“Although use permits are not explicitly made subject to a general plan meeting the
requirements of state law, that condition is necessarily to be implied from the hierarchal
relationship of the land use laws. . . . [Thus,] a use permit is struck from the mold of the zoning
law [GOV’T § 65901 (West 1966 & Supp. 1982)]; the zoning law must comply with the adopted
general plan [GOV’T § 65860]; [and] the adopted general plan must conform with state law
[GOV’T §§ 65300, 65302 (West 1966)]. The validity of the permit process derives from
compliance with this hierarchy of planning laws.”).
117. See Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Cmty. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 522 P.2d 12, 13 (Cal.
1974) (“We conclude that variance boards . . . must render findings to support their ultimate
rulings.”).
118. YUBA CITY, CAL., MUN. CODE, tit. 8, ch. 5, § 8-5.7003 (2011).
119. See id. § 8-5.7003D (“Approval . . . shall only be granted when the following findings
can be made, based on information in the record: 1. The proposal is consistent with the General
Plan[, Yuba City, Cal., Yuba City General Plan ch. 3 (2004), available at http://www.yubacity
.net/documents/Planning/YC-GPAC-Apr-04-Ch-3-FINAL.pdf]. 2. The site for the proposed use
is adequate in size and shape to accommodate said use, public access, parking and loading,
yards, landscaping and other features required by this chapter. 3. The streets serving the site are
adequate to carry the quantity of traffic generated by the proposed use. 4. The site design and
the size and design of the buildings will complement neighboring facilities. 5. The establishment
or operation of the use or building applied for will not be detrimental to the health, safety,
peace, comfort, and general welfare of persons residing or working in the vicinity of the
proposed use or be detrimental or injurious to property and improvements in the neighborhood
or to the general welfare of the City.”).
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specific use on one specific property that might otherwise be
prohibited due to the incompatibility of the proposed use with the
120
existing or anticipated uses of neighboring properties.
3. Unlisted or Prohibited Uses and Zoning Ordinance
Amendments. Zoning ordinances cannot anticipate every potential
land use, and municipalities manage this uncertainty in a variety of
ways. Some ordinances contain a provision that “uses not specifically
121
permitted are prohibited.” Other zoning ordinances contain rules of
construction that give an official, such as the planning director, the
discretion to determine whether a proposed use is similar “in
122
character and impact to a listed use.” If it is, the planning director
has the discretion to treat the proposed use in the same way as the
123
listed use.
If a person proposes a use in a zoning district that does not
explicitly list the use, and if a reasonable construction of the zoning
ordinance leads to the conclusion that the zoning district does not
permit the use, the person has the option of seeking a zoning
amendment. Zoning amendments generally come in two forms: a
zoning-text amendment and a zoning-map amendment. A zoning-text
amendment amends the zoning code itself to change the list of
permitted uses in the applicable zoning district to include the
124
proposed use. A zoning-map amendment occurs when the parcel’s
zoning designation is changed to a different zoning designation that
125
permits the proposed use.
The California Government Code sets forth the minimum
126
procedures that govern both types of amendments. First, the
120. As noted in Part II.A, section 65852 of the California Government Code requires that
zoning regulations “be uniform for each class or kind of building or use of land throughout each
zone.” Nonetheless, courts have held that it does not violate the uniformity requirement to, with
the consent of the project proponent, impose reasonable conditions of approval on projects,
even if the conditions vary from parcel to parcel. See, e.g., J-Marion Co. v. Cnty. of Sacramento,
142 Cal. Rptr. 723, 726 (Ct. App. 1977) (“[U]se limitations imposed upon land by consensual
agreement are not violative of the uniformity provisions of section 65852 . . . .”).
121. BURKE, supra note 60, at 89.
122. E.g., MUN. CODE § 8-5.111.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Text and Map Amendments, UNIV. CITY, MO., http://www.ucitymo.org/
index.aspx?NID=318 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) (“A text amendment is a procedure that
changes the written provisions of the ordinances contained in the [z]oning [c]ode.”).
125. See, e.g., id. (“A map amendment is a procedure that changes the zoning district for a
piece of property and therefore changes the zoning map.”).
126. GOV’T §§ 65853–65857 (West 2009).
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planning commission is required to conduct a public hearing.
Following the public hearing, the commission must provide a written
recommendation supported by its reasons to the municipality’s
128
legislative body, such as the city council. If the planning commission
recommends approval of the zoning amendment, the legislative body
must hold a noticed public hearing after which it may approve,
129
modify, or disapprove the planning commission’s recommendation.
4. Procedural Distinctions Between Zoning Amendments and Use
Permits. Decisions about whether to adopt or amend zoning
130
ordinances are “legislative acts,” whereas decisions about whether
131
to approve use permits are adjudicative, or “quasi-judicial” acts.
“[A] legislative act generally predetermines what the rules shall be for
the regulation of future cases falling under its provisions, while an
adjudicatory act applies law to determine specific rights based upon
132
specific facts ascertained from evidence adduced at a hearing.” This
distinction is significant because California land-use law and the
133
California Code of Civil Procedure treat legislative and adjudicative
acts differently in terms of how such acts are approved as well as in
terms of how a party may challenge the validity of each type of act.
First, “only those governmental decisions which are adjudicative
in nature are subject to procedural due process principles. Legislative
134
action is not burdened by such requirements.” As such, the
California Government Code requires planning agencies to conduct a

127. Id. § 65854.
128. Id. § 65855.
129. Id. §§ 65856–65857.
130. See Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1239 n.11 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“[Z]oning enactments that affect large populations are legislative in nature.”); DeVita v. Cnty.
of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1024 n.3 (Cal. 1995) (“[T]he current planning law recognizes
unequivocally that planning is a legislative undertaking . . . .”); Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of Costa
Mesa, 620 P.2d 565, 566–67 (Cal. 1980) (“California precedent has settled the principle that
zoning ordinances, whatever the size of parcel affected, are legislative acts.”).
131. See The Conditional Use Permit, supra note 114 (“The approval of a conditional use
permit is an administrative, quasi-judicial act. It is not a change of zone, but rather a projectspecific change in the uses allowed on a specific property. Conditional use permits do not
involve the establishment of new codes, regulations, or policies. Instead, a conditional use
permit applies the provisions of the zoning ordinance and its standards to the specific set of
circumstances which characterize the proposed land use.”).
132. Joint Council of Interns & Residents v. Bd. of Supervisors, 258 Cal. Rptr. 762, 766 (Ct.
App. 1989).
133. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1084–1097 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012).
134. Horn v. Cnty. of Ventura, 596 P.2d 1134, 1137 (Cal. 1979).
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noticed public hearing prior to making a decision about whether to
135
approve or deny a use permit. Municipalities are also required to
make findings prior to approving or denying a use permit. By
contrast, because the amendment of a zoning ordinance is a
legislative action, municipalities are not required to make findings
136
regarding a decision to approve or deny a zoning amendment.
Second, in California, local land-use decisions must be
challenged by seeking a writ of mandate (also called mandamus), and
the nature of the writ differs based on the decision being
137
challenged. “The importance of proceeding by a writ of mandate in
land use litigation in state court cannot be overemphasized. The
failure to seek the writ may be a sufficient ground by itself for adverse
138
judgment.” Writs of mandate take two forms: the writ of ordinary
139
140
mandate and the writ of administrative mandate. The writ of
ordinary mandate is the appropriate procedure to challenge
legislative acts, such as the adoption or amendment of a zoning
141
ordinance. The writ of administrative mandate must be used to
challenge adjudicative acts, such as the decision about whether to
142
approve a use permit. Courts are much more deferential to the
planning agency in ordinary mandate than they are in administrative

135. The public hearing requirement is contained in section 65905 of the California
Government Code, and the notice requirements are contained in section 65091 of the California
Government Code.
136. See Native Sun/Lyon Cmtys. v. City of Escondido, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 355 (Ct. App.
1993) (“Legislative acts, of course, do not require findings.”).
137. For procedural requirements for the use of these writs, see CIV. PROC. §§ 1084–1097.
138. EASTMAN, supra note 92, § 21.01.
139. CIV. PROC. § 1085.
140. Id. § 1094.5. The terms “ordinary” and “traditional” mandate are not used in the
California Code of Civil Procedure. The terms are used by practitioners to distinguish the
procedure in section 1085 from the procedure in section 1094.5. Likewise, the term “writ of
administrative mandate” is not used in the California Code of Civil Procedure.
141. See Cnty. of Del Norte v. City of Crescent City, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 179, 184 (Ct. App.
1999) (“Mandate will also lie to correct the exercise of discretionary legislative power, but only
if the action taken is fraudulent or so palpably unreasonable and arbitrary as to reveal an abuse
of discretion as a matter of law. This test is highly deferential, as it should be when the court is
called upon to interfere with the exercise of legislative discretion by an elected governmental
body. Legislative enactments are presumed to be valid; to overcome this presumption the
petitioner must bring forth evidence compelling the conclusion that the ordinance is
unreasonable and invalid.” (citations omitted)).
142. CIV. PROC. § 1094.5.
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143

mandate. Thus, in California the distinctions between zoning
amendments and use permits have great significance.
III. DISTINGUISHING TWO APPLICATIONS OF RLUIPA: GURU
NANAK AND SAN LEANDRO
This Note now builds upon the RLUIPA and land-use
background information introduced in the preceding Parts to examine
two Ninth Circuit RLUIPA cases. One case involved a rezoning, and
the other case involved a use permit. In Guru Nanak, the Ninth
Circuit found that Sutter County, California, imposed a substantial
burden on a religious organization when the country denied two
successive use-permit applications, on two separate parcels, made by
the Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City (Guru Nanak) to build a
144
temple. In San Leandro, the Ninth Circuit found that the City of
San Leandro, California may have imposed a substantial burden on a
religious organization without articulating a compelling reason when
the city denied the organization’s requests for a zoning-map
amendment, a zoning-text amendment, and a use permit that was
145
contingent upon approval of either of the rezoning requests. In
reaching its decision in San Leandro, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily
146
on the reasoning contained in Guru Nanak but failed to distinguish
between the types of land-use applications and the types of
assessments that the municipalities conducted in the two cases. Guru
Nanak involved an individualized assessment of a use permit, whereas
San Leandro involved a generalized assessment of two zoning
ordinance amendments. The Ninth Circuit should have drawn this
distinction between the use permits at issue in Guru Nanak and the

143. Compare Garrick Dev. Co. v. Hayward Unified Sch. Dist., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 902 (Ct.
App. 1992) (“Such limited review [under the narrower standards of ordinary mandate] is
grounded on the doctrine of separation of powers which (1) sanctions the legislative delegation
of authority to the agency and (2) acknowledges the presumed expertise of the agency.”), with
Topanga Ass’n for a Scenic Cmty. v. Los Angeles Cnty., 522 P.2d 12, 13 (Cal. 1974) (requiring
Los Angeles County to vacate its grant of a variance in administrative mandate, stating that “a
reviewing court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the findings of the
administrative board and whether the findings support the board’s action”).
144. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir.
2006).
145. See Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1061
(9th Cir.) (“We find that there is a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the City
imposed a substantial burden on the Church’s religious exercise under RLUIPA.”), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 251 (2011).
146. See id. at 1066–70 (citing Guru Nanak repeatedly).
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amendments to zoning ordinances at issue in San Leandro. Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit should have concluded that decisions by a
municipality about whether to amend its zoning ordinance are
“generalized assessments” that fall outside the scope of RLUIPA’s
Section 5 hook.
A. Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter
In 2001, Guru Nanak proposed to construct a temple to serve
seventy-five people on a 1.89-acre parcel that it owned on Grove
147
Road in Sutter County, California. The parcel was located in the R1 district, which was used primarily for large-lot, single-family homes,
and which allowed churches and temples, subject to the issuance of a
148
conditional-use permit. Sutter County’s zoning code’s goal is to
ensure that uses that “have the potential to negatively impact
adjoining properties and uses” receive “a more comprehensive
review . . . in order to evaluate and mitigate any potentially
149
detrimental impacts.” The planning commission may—but need
not—approve or conditionally approve the use permit after it makes
several findings regarding the impact of the proposed use and its
150
consistency with the general plan. Sutter County’s planning staff
reviewed Guru Nanak’s proposal and recommended that the planning
commission grant Guru Nanak’s use permit, subject to certain
conditions designed to mitigate any potential conflicts between the
151
temple and the nearby established residences. In spite of the
planning staff’s recommendation, and based on concerns about
increased traffic and noise resulting from the proposed temple, the
152
planning commission unanimously denied the use permit.
In 2002, Guru Nanak acquired a 28.79-acre parcel located on
153
George Washington Boulevard in Sutter County. Guru Nanak
proposed to convert a 2300-square-foot single-family home located on
the parcel into a temple by adding approximately five hundred square
154
feet to the structure. The property contained an orchard, as did all

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 981–82.
Id. at 982.
SUTTER COUNTY, CAL., ZONING CODE § 1500-8210 (2010).
Id. § 1500-8216.
Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 982.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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155

surrounding parcels. The nearest residence was over two hundred
feet from Guru Nanak’s northern property line and over three
156
hundred feet from the proposed temple. The parcel was located in
land zoned as AG, a classification for general agricultural use, which,
like the R-1 district, permitted churches and temples subject to the
157
issuance of a use permit.
Guru Nanak applied for a use permit and proposed to limit each
158
service to seventy-five people. Once again, staff recommended that
the planning commission approve the project, subject to several
conditions, including the addition of landscaping beyond what the
zoning ordinance required, limitations on the type of lighting,
construction dust mitigation, a prohibition on any type of
development within twenty-five feet of the north property line,
prohibitions on any outdoor services or musical events, and a limit on
159
the number of people on the site to seventy-five at a time.
During the public hearing, a representative of the temple pointed
out the differences between Guru Nanak’s earlier Grove Road
160
application and its new George Washington Boulevard application.
Several neighbors spoke in opposition to the project, again citing
161
noise and traffic concerns. Some also believed that the temple
would conflict with the surrounding agricultural uses and depreciate
162
property values in the area. By a vote of four to three, the planning
163
commission approved the project. Several neighbors appealed the
planning commission’s decision to the Sutter County Board of
164
Supervisors.
County planning staff prepared a report for the board meeting
that specifically addressed the neighbors’ concerns and recommended
165
that the board affirm the planning commission’s approval. In spite
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 983.
159. SUTTER CNTY. PLANNING STAFF MEMORANDUM, Sutter Cnty. Planning Comm’n 5–9,
11–12 (Mar. 27, 2002), available at http://www.co.sutter.ca.us/pdf/cs/pc/staff_reports/2002/
UP_02-01_Nanak_Sikh.pdf.
160. Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 983.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. The church agreed to concessions which included, among other things, increasing
the approved twenty-five-foot buffer along the north property line to one hundred feet. Id.
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of the planning staff’s recommendation, the board unanimously
reversed the planning commission and denied Guru Nanak’s use
166
permit. Guru Nanak sued Sutter County under RLUIPA, claiming
that the board’s denial of its second use permit constituted a
167
“substantial burden” on its religious exercise.
The district court granted Guru Nanak’s motion for summary
judgment, invalidated the county’s denial, and enjoined the county to
immediately grant Guru Nanak’s application because it found that
Sutter County had substantially burdened religious exercise without
168
evidence of a compelling interest to justify the burden. The district
court was troubled by the county’s multiple denials, especially in light
of the fact that Guru Nanak purchased its second property to address
the county’s stated concerns behind its denial of Guru Nanak’s first
169
application. The county appealed, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed
170
the district court’s decision.
B. International Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San
Leandro
Founded in San Leandro in 1947, the Faith Fellowship
171
Foursquare Church, a congregation affiliated with the ICFG, had
172
sixty-five members in 1993. Although it constructed a new sanctuary
with nearly seven hundred seats in 2003, the congregation had
173
outgrown its space by 2005 and began to look for a larger property.

166. Id. at 984.
167. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 326 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1148
(E.D. Cal. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d, 634 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1152 (“[T]he denial of the use permit, particularly when coupled with the denial
of [Guru Nanak’s] previous application, actually inhibits [Guru Nanak’s] religious exercise.”).
170. Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 981.
171. The plaintiff in the case was the ICFG, which “alleges that the real party in interest is
Faith Fellowship Foursquare Church . . . , a congregation affiliated with ICFG, and located in
San Leandro.” Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 632 F. Supp. 2d
925, 929 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 634 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011).
172. Id.
173. Id. The church conducted three Sunday services for more than 1,700 congregants. Id.
During the week, it provided a variety of programs serving different groups, including “children,
the disadvantaged, women, youth, and persons struggling with addictions.” Id. On Wednesday
nights, the church used a kitchen “smaller than the kitchen in most homes” to feed between
three hundred and four hundred people. Id. The church asserted that its parking lot could
accommodate only 154 vehicles, forcing members to park on surrounding residential streets, “as
much as a 20-minute walk away from the Church.” Id. at 930.

ERTMER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

LAND-USE REQUESTS AND RLUIPA

9/17/2012 1:01 PM

105

At the time, the city permitted “assembly uses” in the R (residential)
districts subject to the issuance of a conditional-use permit, but it
174
prohibited assembly uses in all commercial and industrial districts.
In March 2006, the ICFG signed a purchase agreement for a property
175
in a district zoned IP (Industrial Park). In May 2006, church officials
176
met with the planning staff to discuss their proposed use. The staff
advised the ICFG officials that the IP zone did not allow assembly
uses and that the text of the zoning code would need to be amended
before a church, or any assembly use, could locate on an industrially
zoned parcel, including the parcels that the ICFG had agreed to
177
purchase. The ICFG subsequently applied to rezone the property as
IL (Industrial Limited), and applied to amend the text of the zoning
code to establish use permit procedures for conditionally permitting
178
assembly uses in the IL district. On April 12, 2007, the city’s
planning commission voted to deny the ICFG’s rezoning and
amendment applications because they conflicted with two provisions
179
of the city’s general plan. The ICFG appealed the decision to the
180
city council, which on May 7, 2007, unanimously upheld the
181
The
planning commission’s denial of the proposed rezoning.
planning staff offered to assist the ICFG in its effort to locate a
182
different, appropriately zoned parcel. The ICFG accepted the
183
planning staff’s offer but also filed a lawsuit on July 12, 2007.
In its lawsuit, the ICFG alleged several constitutional claims and
the following three RLUIPA claims: (1) “that the City’s land use
restrictions place a ‘substantial burden on religious exercise,’” (2)
“that the denial of the rezoning application constitutes ‘treatment of
religious assembly on less than equal terms with nonreligious

174. Id at 930. Assembly uses included activities performed by secular and nonsecular users,
such as churches, clubs, lodges, and other organizations. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 930–34. The ICFG also applied for a use permit pursuant to the new standards it
requested the city to adopt in the IL district. Id. at 931.
179. Id. at 934.
180. At about the same time, the ICFG applied for a use permit under the existing zoning.
Id. This application is somewhat inexplicable because the existing zoning did not allow use
permits for assembly uses. Id. The city, nonetheless, processed and denied the use permit on the
grounds that the proposed use was inconsistent with the property’s zoning. Id. at 934–35.
181. Id. at 934.
182. Id. at 935.
183. Id.
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assembly,’” and (3) “that the denial of the Church’s use of [its]
property constitutes ‘total exclusion from jurisdiction or unreasonable
184
limits on religious assemblies within jurisdiction.’”
The district court granted San Leandro’s motion for summary
judgment on all claims. Regarding the substantial-burden claim, the
district court found the city’s zoning code to be “clearly neutral”
because it “treats religious assemblies on the same footing as other
assembly uses, and permits those uses with a conditional use permit in
areas zoned R—which constitute more than 50% of the City’s land
185
area.” The district court further found that the ICFG failed to
provide sufficient evidence to support its claim that no other suitable
properties existed in the city, and that, even if the ICFG had provided
sufficient evidence, a dearth of properties does not equal a substantial
burden “[i]n the absence of a showing that the City acted arbitrarily
186
in ways suggesting actual discrimination.” The district court also
noted that RLUIPA does not require cities to grant religious users
“preferential rights over other property owners, or to protect
churches from the reality that the marketplace might dictate that
187
certain facilities are not available to those who desire them.”
Regarding the equal-terms claim, the district court held, among other
things, that the city treated the ICFG’s proposed use no differently
188
than any other assembly use when it denied the applications. The
court noted that the ICFG’s argument, “carried to its logical
conclusion, would mean that the City could not zone its land for
189
categories of uses.” Regarding the ICFG’s total-exclusion claim, the
district court held that churches are not totally excluded from San
Leandro because approximately 54.6 percent of the city can
190
accommodate assembly uses. The court further noted that the
ICFG’s claim could not rest “simply on the fact that the Church has

184. Id. at 935–36 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a), (b)(1), (b)(3) (2006)).
185. Id. at 942.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 946–47.
189. Id. at 947.
190. After meeting with the church officials, the planning staff examined all nonresidential
parcels in San Leandro to determine whether any of them could accommodate assembly uses in
a way that would comply with the general plan. Id. at 933–34. At the end of its review, the staff
determined that an additional 196 properties could accommodate assembly uses. Id. The city
created the “AU Overlay District” to allow assembly uses on these 196 parcels without changing
the remainder of each parcel’s underlying zoning. Id.
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decided that the only property that will suit it is one that the City will
191
not zone for assembly use.”
The ICFG appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment, finding that “there is a triable
issue of material fact regarding whether the City imposed a
substantial burden . . . under RLUIPA” and “that the City failed as a
192
matter of law to prove a compelling interest for its actions.” The
Ninth Circuit concluded that “while the zoning scheme itself may be
facially neutral and generally applicable, the individualized
assessment that the City made to determine that the Church’s
rezoning and CUP [conditional-use permit] request should be denied
193
is not.” The Ninth Circuit determined that the city’s denial was
subject to RLUIPA’s compelling interest test when it said:
The City’s treatment of the Church’s applications constitutes an
“individualized assessment.” Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City
v. County of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2006). Further, the
City’s Zoning Code undeniably is a “system of land use regulations”
within the meaning of RLUIPA because it is a system of “zoning
[laws] . . . that limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of
194
land . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5).

The Ninth Circuit thus relied on Guru Nanak as a guide for its
RLUIPA analysis, but in doing so, the court ignored the most
important distinguishing feature between the two cases. Specifically,
the Ninth Circuit failed to acknowledge that Sutter County conducted
an individualized assessment in response to Guru Nanak’s requested
use permit, whereas San Leandro conducted a generalized assessment
in response to the ICFG’s requested zoning amendments. Part IV
offers a reading of RLUIPA that distinguishes between individualized
and generalized assessments, a distinction that the Ninth Circuit
failed to recognize in San Leandro.

191. Id. at 948.
192. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011).
193. Id. at 1066.
194. Id. (alterations in original).
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IV. GENERALIZED VS. INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENTS: THE
CORRECT CONSTRUCTION OF RLUIPA
This Part argues that the Ninth Circuit was correct in Guru
Nanak but incorrect in San Leandro when it held that the land-use
requests in each case were individualized assessments within the
scope of RLUIPA. It offers an analysis of RLUIPA that draws a
principled distinction between the two cases and shows that San
Leandro’s denials of the ICFG’s rezoning requests were outside the
scope of RLUIPA because the city conducted a generalized
assessment rather than an individualized assessment.
In San Leandro, the ICFG requested both a zoning-map and a
zoning-text amendment. The zoning-map amendment would have
changed the zoning of the ICFG’s parcel of land, and the zoning-text
amendment would have permitted assembly uses on all parcels
already located in the proposed zoning classification throughout the
195
city. When it held that San Leandro’s “treatment of the Church’s
196
applications constituted an ‘individualized assessment,’” the Ninth
Circuit fundamentally misunderstood the nature of a zoning
197
ordinance and the nature of a request to amend a zoning ordinance.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize what a municipality
actually does when it reviews amendments to the zoning ordinance;
the municipality conducts a generalized assessment of the
implications of approving a zoning-map amendment, and it conducts
a generalized assessment of the jurisdiction-wide effects of the
zoning-text amendments. The assessments are generalized because
the municipality considers jurisdiction-wide impacts beyond the
specific impacts of the project that prompted the proposed
amendments.

195. See supra Part III.B.
196. San Leandro, 673 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty.
of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006)).
197. Interestingly, when the Ninth Circuit denied San Leandro’s petition for a rehearing en
banc, it issued an amended opinion that made four changes. Id. at 1060–61. One of the changes
modified a sentence in the original opinion that read as follows: “There is no dispute that the
City’s treatment of the Church’s applications constitutes an ‘individualized assessment.’” Int’l
Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 634 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2011),
reh’g en banc denied, amended, and superseded by San Leandro, 673 F.3d. The amended opinion
deleted the words “[t]here is no dispute that.” San Leandro, 673 F.3d at 1060. The sentence now
reads as follows: “The City’s treatment of the Church’s applications constitutes an
‘individualized assessment.’” Id. at 1066.
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A. Consideration of a Zoning-Map Amendment
When a municipality considers a request for a zoning-map
amendment, it must evaluate the implications of the project under
consideration. But for two reasons, the municipality’s assessment goes
beyond an evaluation of the effects of that single project. First, as
soon as the zoning map is amended, the owner of that parcel may
198
establish any of the uses permitted in the new zoning classification.
If one or more of the permitted uses in the proposed zoning
classification have the potential to conflict with the uses of the
surrounding properties, then a municipality would have a valid reason
199
for denying the map amendment.
Second, the new zoning
classification will apply to that parcel indefinitely, not only during the
200
life of the sought-after use. In San Leandro, the city would have
considered the potential impacts of the ICFG’s proposed church, but
it also would have considered the potential impacts of every other
possible use on the subject parcel that the new zoning classification
would permit. Stated differently, after the zoning of the parcel was
amended, the ICFG—and any future user—could have operated any
of the other uses permitted in the new district. San Leandro’s
assessment of the rezoning proposal was therefore generalized.
By contrast, when a municipality considers a request for a use
permit, it makes an individualized assessment of that proposed use.
For example, when Guru Nanak applied to Sutter County for its use
permits, the county evaluated only the proposed temple in the
201
context of the surrounding properties.
In both use permit
applications, planning staff recommended conditions of approval that
were tailored to the specific use and location, such as a limit to the
number of people on the property, additional landscaping, and a
202
larger building setback. Even if Guru Nanak had chosen not to use
its property for the proposed temple, the underlying zoning of its
parcel would have remained the same. Sutter County’s assessment of
the religious land use was individualized because approval of the use

198. See supra Part II.B.
199. Generally, a municipality may not place conditions on one particular parcel within a
zoning classification to preclude certain permitted uses it might find objectionable. For a
discussion of the “like uses alike” principle, see supra note 99 and accompanying text.
200. See supra Part II.B.
201. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
202. See supra Part III.A.
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permit would allow no other uses beyond those that were specifically
requested.
B. Consideration of a Zoning-Text Amendment
Similarly, when a municipality considers a proposal to amend the
text of its zoning code, it must necessarily consider implications
beyond those associated with the project that prompted the proposed
203
amendment. Because of the “like uses alike” principle, all parcels in
204
a zoning district must be governed by the same rules. Therefore,
when the ICFG requested to amend the zoning ordinance to allow
assembly uses in the IL district with a use permit, San Leandro would
have assessed the request for its suitability on the ICFG’s property,
but it also needed to consider the implications of the proposed change
on every parcel with IL zoning throughout the entire city. Even if the
proposal had been suitable on the ICFG’s property, San Leandro
could have determined that the proposal to allow assembly uses with
a use permit would have been unworkable on at least one other
parcel with the same zoning classification. Denying the zoning-text
amendment for this reason would have been legitimate and
completely unrelated to the ICFG’s use of its property.
By contrast, when a municipality considers a request for a use
permit, the permit is confined to the property that was the subject of
the application for the time allowed by the permit. The assessments
that Sutter County conducted in Guru Nanak were individualized
assessments because approval of the requested use permit would have
been limited to Guru Nanak’s parcel and would have had no effect on
any other properties in the county.
In San Leandro, the Ninth Circuit relied on Guru Nanak for the
premise that RLUIPA applies to land-use decisions that result from
205
an individualized assessment of a proposed project. Assuming
206
RLUIPA’s constitutionality, this reliance represents a correct
statement of the law, but the Ninth Circuit failed to distinguish
between the different types of land-use entitlements that were at issue
in the two cases. The court specifically stated that “while the zoning

203. See supra Part II.B.3–4.
204. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65830 (West 2009).
205. See supra notes 192–194 and accompanying text.
206. Not all would agree that RLUIPA is constitutional even as applied to individualized
assessments of the type conducted by Sutter County in Guru Nanak. See, e.g., MARCI A.
HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2007).
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scheme itself may be facially neutral and generally applicable, the
individualized assessment that the City made to determine that the
207
Church’s rezoning and CUP request should be denied is not.” The
Ninth Circuit never acknowledged that the ICFG’s use-permit
application could be processed only after the zoning map was
amended to change the ICFG’s property from IP to IL, and only after
the zoning-ordinance text was amended to allow assembly uses with a
use permit in the IL district. Although San Leandro considered the
impacts of the proposal on the ICFG’s parcel, it also had to consider
208
the impacts that the proposal would have had on the rest of the city.
To say that the city conducted an individualized assessment of the
ICFG’s rezoning applications only comprehends part of what the city
assessed. By applying RLUIPA to generalized assessments such as
the ones the city conducted in San Leandro, the Ninth Circuit
expanded the coverage of RLUIPA’s Section 5 jurisdictional hook,
which, by its own terms, applies only to “individualized
209
assessments.” The Ninth Circuit’s construction of RLUIPA renders
the statute overbroad by precluding legitimate conduct in the process
of attempting to prevent unconstitutional discrimination.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBTS AVOIDED BY A NEW ANALYSIS OF
RLUIPA
According to the Supreme Court, “The so-called canon of
constitutional avoidance is an interpretive tool, counseling that
ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious
210
constitutional doubts.” Courts presume that the legislature would
211
not intend to pass a law that raises constitutional questions. Thus,
when a statute could be interpreted in multiple ways, a court will
207. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011).
208. In fact, after the city’s planning staff received and began to evaluate the ICFG’s
application, they expressed concern about the citywide impacts of amending the zoning text to
allow assembly uses on other parcels in the IL district. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v.
City of San Leandro, 632 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev’d, 634 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011). The staff therefore began to develop an alternative
mechanism for liberalizing the treatment of assembly uses citywide. Id. at 932. As a result of this
effort, the city adopted the “Assembly Use Overlay District,” and recommended applying it to
196 nonresidential parcels. Id. at 933. The ICFG’s parcel was not one of the 196. Id. at 934.
209. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
210. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009).
211. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991) (“This canon is followed out of respect for
Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.”).
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“avoid an interpretation of a federal statute that engenders
constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative interpretation poses
212
no constitutional question.”
As discussed in Part IV, RLUIPA’s scope-of-application section
has two plausible readings, only one of which raises serious
constitutional questions. Under one reading, the reading for which
this Note advocates, RLUIPA applies only when the government
conducts an individualized assessment of the religious institution’s
proposed use of its land. Under the other reading, the reading
declared by the Ninth Circuit in San Leandro, RLUIPA applies to
any assessment of a land-use entitlement that is requested by a
religious user, regardless of whether granting the entitlement will
change the allowable uses of property other than the property owned
by the religious institution. This latter reading creates constitutional
doubt.
The reading of RLUIPA proposed by this Note has three major
virtues in addition to those discussed in Part IV. First, unlike the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in San Leandro, it comports with Supreme
Court precedent regarding the Free Exercise Clause and Congress’s
Section 5 power to enforce it. Second, it preserves the ability of state
and local governments to exercise their reserved police powers for
land-use planning. Third, it continues to allow RLUIPA to protect
religious institutions such as Guru Nanak when the government
substantially burdens their religious exercise in the course of making
an individualized assessment about whether to grant an exemption
from the generally applicable land-use rules.
A. Congressional Authority To Enforce, Not Expand, the Free
Exercise Clause
RLUIPA prohibits governments from imposing a substantial
burden on religious exercise through land-use regulations “under
which a government makes, or has in place formal or informal
procedures or practices that permit the government to make,
individualized assessments of the proposed uses for the property
213
involved.” This language appears to be tailored to track the Court’s
language in Boerne when it quoted Smith to distinguish those two
cases from an earlier line of Free Exercise Clause cases that imposed

212. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C) (2006).
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strict scrutiny on government acts which caused religious hardship
214
“where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions.”
But an individual exemption is not the same thing as an individualized
assessment. Because assessments cover more actions than exemptions,
the Ninth Circuit’s reading of RLUIPA expands Congress’s Section 5
power beyond what the Court recognized in Boerne.
Contrasting San Leandro and Guru Nanak is helpful here. In
Guru Nanak, the applicant sought a use permit pursuant to the
system and procedures that were established in Sutter County’s
215
zoning code. When a use permit is granted, the underlying zoning
remains the same; the applicant therefore requests something akin to
an exemption from the zoning that otherwise would prohibit the use
for which he or she applied. In other words, a use permit is an
exemption from a generally applicable law. In San Leandro, the
religious institution applied for a zoning-map and a zoning-text
216
amendment. Although zoning ordinances may be amended, the
amendment process is not an exemption because a zoning
amendment changes the underlying law that applies to the applicant
as well as to every other land user in the jurisdiction. Stated
differently, a zoning amendment is not a request for an exemption to
a generally applicable law. It is a request to change the law itself.
When San Leandro assessed the ICFG’s application for a zoningmap and a zoning-text amendment, it was not evaluating whether to
grant the ICFG an exemption. When considering the zoning-map
amendment, the planning commission conducted a generalized
assessment to determine whether to change the underlying law that
would apply to the ICFG’s property. The zoning-text amendment
required a similar generalized assessment to determine whether to
change the underlying law that would apply throughout the entire IL
zoning district. The Ninth Circuit’s construction of RLUIPA in San
Leandro requires governments to articulate a compelling interest
whenever they deny a request for a change in the underlying law. A
proper reading of RLUIPA in light of Smith and Boerne would
require a compelling interest only when a government fails to extend
a preexisting system of exemptions to a religious institution. Smith
and Boerne simply do not acknowledge a congressional authority to

214. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997) (quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 884 (1990)); see also supra note 53 and accompanying text.
215. See supra Part III.A.
216. See supra Part III.B.
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impose strict scrutiny when a government denies a request by a
religious institution to change the underlying, generally applicable
217
law.
B. Reading Congruence and Proportionality into RLUIPA To
Preserve Values of Federalism
As discussed in Part II, land-use planning in California is a highly
specialized subset of California law, best thought of as a hierarchy of
regulation types. As the California Supreme Court has stated, “[T]he
general plan truly became, and today remains, a ‘constitution . . . for
future development’ located at the top of the ‘hierarchy of local
218
government law regulating land use.’”
If general plans are
constitutions and zoning ordinances are statutes implementing the
219
constitutions, use permits are “a system of individual exemptions”
from the generally applicable rules governing the permissible uses of
220
property within a jurisdiction.
Beyond requiring jurisdictions to articulate a compelling interest
when they refuse to approve a rezoning request, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in San Leandro makes plain that the city’s reasons for
denying the rezoning request—that approving the request would have
conflicted with two important general plan provisions—did not
221
constitute a compelling interest. But approving the application to
avoid liability under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of RLUIPA
would result in a conflict with the California Government Code,
which states that “[c]ounty or city zoning ordinances shall be
222
consistent with the general plan of the county or city.”
To solve this dilemma, a municipality could amend the general
plan to conform to the religious institution’s proposed zoning. This
solution might not be possible in all instances, however, because the

217. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
218. DeVita v. Cnty. of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Cal. 1995) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lesher Commc’ns, Inc. v. City
of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 321 (Cal. 1990); and Neighborhood Action Grp. v. Cnty. of
Calaveras, 203 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406 (Ct. App. 1984)).
219. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514.
220. See supra Part II. In other words, by having a process by which a municipality may
approve something that is otherwise prohibited, the municipality establishes a system of
individual exemptions similar to those that were at issue in Smith.
221. Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 673 F.3d 1059, 1061 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011).
222. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65860(a) (West 2009).
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223

general plan must be internally consistent. Moreover, this solution
misses the point of a general plan. As the California Supreme Court
has stated, “The Planning and Zoning Law does not contemplate that
general plans will be amended to conform to zoning ordinances. The
224
tail does not wag the dog.” The Ninth Circuit’s holding thus
intrudes into California’s land-use decision-making process in two
ways: it upends the relationship between the zoning ordinance and
the general plan, and it takes away the authority of local governments
to make legislative decisions that would otherwise be valid. At a more
fundamental level, by requiring jurisdictions to approve a rezoning
request even if the request conflicts with the general plan, the Ninth
Circuit places municipalities in the position of choosing between
complying with RLUIPA or complying with a valid state law.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in San Leandro also interferes with
the distinction that the California Code of Civil Procedure draws
between the writs of ordinary and administrative mandate.
Municipalities are accustomed to assembling a detailed record that
contains the basis for quasi-judicial decisions, such as decisions about
whether to approve an application for a use permit, because such
decisions must be challenged by the more stringent writ of
225
administrative mandate. By contrast, legislative decisions, such as
decisions about whether to approve a rezoning request, are subject to
judicial review through the writ of ordinary mandate, which does not
226
require the municipality to present a detailed administrative record.
Thus, when Sutter County was sued in federal court under RLUIPA,
its administrative record was thorough because it was responding to a
request for a use permit, which is a quasi-judicial act subject to
administrative mandate. San Leandro’s record was unlikely to be as
thoroughly developed, however, because the city was responding to a
request for a zoning-map amendment and a zoning-text amendment,
both of which are legislative acts and subject to the more deferential
227
writ of ordinary mandate. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in San
Leandro could catch municipalities off guard if they are now required

223. Id. § 65300.5 (West 2010).
224. Lesher Commc’ns, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 322 (Cal. 1990) (citations
omitted).
225. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1094.5 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012).
226. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
227. For a discussion of the differences between these writs of mandate, see supra Part
II.B.4.

ERTMER IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

116

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/17/2012 1:01 PM

[Vol. 62:79

to articulate a compelling interest for their legislative decisions to
deny a religious institution’s rezoning request.
The regulation of land uses has consistently been recognized as a
constitutional exercise of state and local governments’ reserved police
228
powers. As discussed in Part IV, by requiring San Leandro to
articulate a compelling reason for denying the ICFG’s rezoning
application and simultaneously holding that San Leandro’s adherence
to its unchallenged general plan is not a compelling interest, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision precludes San Leandro—and all other
municipalities in the circuit—from denying rezoning requests
regardless of the jurisdiction-wide impacts on its state-mandated, and
otherwise-valid, general plan. This reading of RLUIPA evinces the
same lack of congruence and proportionality that RFRA also lacked.
Such a reading makes it seem as if RLUIPA is not “responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to
229
attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections.” Under
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, RLUIPA presents the same separation of
230
powers problem that RFRA presented in Boerne.
In the wake of San Leandro, when a religious institution applies
to amend either the zoning map or the text of the zoning ordinance,
municipalities are held to higher substantive and procedural
231
standards than what California law requires. The Ninth Circuit
could have avoided these conflicts by applying the reading suggested
in this Note and distinguishing between the types of land-use
232
entitlements at issue in Guru Nanak and San Leandro.

228. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994) (“[R]egulation of land
use [is] a function traditionally performed by local governments.”).
229. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
230. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
231. This higher standard is also the heart of the problem described by Justice Stevens in his
concurring opinion in Boerne, in which he said that RFRA “has provided the Church with a
legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain. This governmental preference for religion,
as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment.” Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537
(Stevens, J., concurring).
232. Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit could have held that RLUIPA does not apply to any
request that seeks to amend the zoning ordinance because, as applied to San Leandro, RLUIPA
is an unconstitutional intrusion into substantive and procedural California law. Such a holding
would have preserved the notion that a general plan is a local constitution and a zoning
ordinance is a statute implementing the constitution, but it would have sacrificed all of
RLUIPA.
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C. Preserving RLUIPA
Finally, this Note’s reading of RLUIPA does not render the
statute meaningless. On the contrary, a religious land user whose
request involves the government’s individualized assessment
regarding whether to grant an exemption from the generally
applicable rules would still be able to bring a cause of action under
RLUIPA. Variances and use permits such as those at issue in Guru
Nanak still would be within RLUIPA’s scope of application. Before
applying RLUIPA’s strict-scrutiny and compelling-interest standards,
courts would need to examine the nature of the requested entitlement
and make a determination that the request necessitates an
individualized assessment. Therefore, the statute still would protect
applicants like Guru Nanak, whereas cities like San Leandro would
maintain control over their ability to conduct long-range planning.
CONCLUSION
In San Leandro, the Ninth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to San
Leandro’s denial of the ICFG’s rezoning applications pursuant to its
interpretation of RLUIPA. Its decision to do so, however, was based
neither on a careful analysis of whether the statute applied to the
case, nor on a reasoned decision regarding which line of free-exercise
cases to use. Instead, the Ninth Circuit simply applied the reasoning
and holding of another RLUIPA case, Guru Nanak, without
analyzing the differences between the types of land-use entitlements
at issue in the two cases: an individualized assessment of a use permit
in Guru Nanak and a generalized assessment of a rezoning in San
Leandro.
The best and most plausible construction of RLUIPA rests on
the fundamental and legally cognizable distinction between the
individualized assessments and generalized assessments that
governments conduct when considering whether to approve different
types of land-use entitlements. By its own terms, RLUIPA applies
only when the government conducts an individualized assessment,
such as Sutter County’s consideration of the use permits for which
Guru Nanak applied; RLUIPA does not apply to generalized
assessments such as the one that San Leandro conducted in response
to the ICFG’s proposed zoning-ordinance amendments.
The distinction between individualized and generalized
assessments is not only consistent with the text of RLUIPA, it also
comports with Supreme Court precedent regarding Congress’s
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Section 5 power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause. According to
the two lines of free-exercise cases, strict scrutiny applies when the
government has a mechanism in place for approving exemptions to
generally applicable laws, whereas courts use rational basis review
when a government simply applies its generally applicable rules. In
other words, in instances in which the government conducts an
individualized assessment to consider whether to grant an exemption,
such as Sutter County did in Guru Nanak, the government’s decision
not to grant the exemption would be subject to strict scrutiny.
Reading RLUIPA to exclude generalized assessments from its scope
of application ensures that Congress has not altered the substance of
the First Amendment by providing religious institutions with a
mechanism of forcing local governments to change their generally
applicable land-use laws.
Finally, applying RLUIPA only to land-use assessments that are
individualized ensures that state and local governments can continue
to exercise their ability to control their own destiny based on the
specific needs of their community. Such a reading of RLUIPA still
preserves a federal cause of action for those whose religious exercise
is substantially burdened when the government has conducted an
individualized assessment. This reading of RLUIPA strikes the
appropriate balance between preservation of the traditional powers
of the states and the federal government’s interest in eliminating
discrimination.

